Course Syllabus
Download Syllabus
Politics of Authoritarian Regimes
Fall 2022
Course Number: 01:790:342 Instructor: Xian Huang
Class Time: Mon/Th 12:10 PM -1:30 PM Office: Hickman Hall 403
Classroom: Hickman 205 Phone: (848) 932-9380
Office hours: by appointment Email: xian.huang@rutgers.edu
Course Overview
The overwhelming majority of governments throughout history have been undemocratic. Despite the “third wave” of democracy after the Cold War, many authoritarian regimes have remained surprisingly resilient. A third of the world’s countries and about half of the world’s population still live under autocratic rule today. The study of politics is thus incomplete without careful consideration of what leads to the formation of authoritarian systems, as well as their durability within an increasingly globalized international context. The goal of the class is to help students develop a greater understanding of authoritarian regimes by starting with basic concepts, such as differentiating authoritarian regime types and their power foundations. We will then build upon these concepts to tackle more complex questions about authoritarian regimes’ ruling institutions and strategies, and the roles of media, patronage, and coercion in supporting – or challenging – authoritarian rule. At last, we will discuss a variety of issue areas under authoritarian rule, including economy, collective action, and governance.
We will take a thematic approach to the study of authoritarian regimes, but in order to reinforce the arguments presented the lessons will be supplemented by a case study approach, through which students will contribute to the lecture and discussions by presenting the results of their case studies. The course thus combines theoretical and empirical study, lecture and class discussion, in order to dissect the characteristics of authoritarian regimes and to provide students with a rich environment to learn about the diversity of these regimes, past and present.
Prerequisites
Students may take this course without prerequisites; however, previous background in the study of comparative politics will be helpful.
Requirements and Evaluation
Lectures and reading are arranged with topical coverage. Grades will be based on class participation (25%), case study presentation (15%), midterm exam (30%), and final exam (30%).
Class Participation
It is highly unlikely you will be able to succeed on exams and assignments without regular class attendance. If you must miss any class meeting, please use the University absence reporting website to indicate the date and reason for your absence.
To protect the health and well-being of all members of the University community, masks must be worn by all persons on campus when within six feet of others and in buildings in non-private enclosed settings (e.g., common workspaces, workstations, meeting rooms, classrooms, etc.). If you feel ill, please stay home.
Case-Study Presentation
Each student will select one topic for case study from the list in the Course Overview (see pg.3) and make an in-class presentation (about 25-30 minutes) based on the readings and own research. Sign up the topic HERE. The presentation slides should be uploaded to the course website on Canvas no later than 5 p.m. on the day prior to the class.
Exams
Both mid-term and final exams are take-home essays. If you would like a review on effective writing for essay tests, I recommend this website: https://www.csbsju.edu/academic-advising/study-skills-guide/essay-exam.
Topics for the midterm exam (essays) will be posted at Canvas on October 28 and the essays are due on October 30.
Topics for the final exam (essays) will be posted at Canvas on December 16 and the essays are due on December 19.
Textbooks
Ezrow, Natasha, and Erica Frantz. 2011. Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and their Leaders. New York: Continuum. (ISBN: 978-1441173966)
Svolik, Milan W. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press. (ISBN: 978-1107607453)
Readings
The textbooks can be ordered from Amazon.com or Barnes and Noble (bn.com) where less expensive copies are often available. All readings are available online and can be accessed in Canvas Modules.
Academic Integrity
In accordance with Rutgers University policy on Academic Integrity, you are expected to fully comply with the school’s policies. Please see: http://academicintegrity.rutgers.edu
Students with Disabilities
Students with disabilities who require accommodation should review the following statement from the Office of Disability Services (https://ods.rutgers.edu/faculty/syllabus).
COURSE OVERVIEW
Week 1 Introduction
PART I Concepts, Measurement, and Theoretical Foundations
Week 2 Political Regimes and Measurement
Week 3 Seizure of Power and Leadership Succession
Case Study#1: Hereditary Succession
Week 4 Power Sharing
Case Study#2: Personalist Dictatorship
PART II Institutions and Ruling Strategies
Week 5 Political Parties
Case Study#3: The Party-State in China
Week 6 Legislatures
Case Study#4: “Rule of Law” in Authoritarian Regimes
Week 7 Elections
Case Study#5: Autocratic Elections
Week 8 Use of Forces
Case Study#6: Military Rule in Latin America
Week 9 Distributive Politics
Week 10 Media
Case Study#7: Is Technology a Challenge or Weapon for Authoritarian Regimes?
PART III Issues under Authoritarian Rule
Week 11 Economy
Case Study#8: Developmental States in East Asia
Week 12 Protests
Case Study#9: The Arab Spring
Week 13 Policymaking
Case Study # 10: Social Wellbeing under Authoritarianism
Topics and Readings
(Readings marked with an asterisk are required. Other readings are recommended for case study.)
Week 1 (9/8): Introduction
* Svolik, Milan W., Chapter 1.
* Ezrow and Frantz, pp. 55-67.
Part I: Concepts, Measurement, and Theoretical Foundations
Week 2 (9/12): Political Regimes and Measurement
What distinguishes authoritarian from democratic regimes? What are distinguishing characteristics of different types of authoritarian regimes? What are major trends over time regarding the frequency of dictatorships relative to democracies, as well as the frequency of different types of authoritarian regimes?
* Ezrow and Frantz, Chapters 1, 2, and 13.
* Svolik, Milan W., Chapter 2.
Recommended Reading:
* Freedom House. Freedom in the World. Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world
* Polity5: regime authority characteristics and transitions datasets. Available at
https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
* Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Sandra Grahn, Nazifa Alizada, Lisa Gastaldi, Sebastian Hellmeier, Garry Hindle and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2020. Autocratization Surges – Resistance Grows. Democracy Report 2020. Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem). Available at https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf
Week 3 (9/19): Seizing Power and Leadership Succession
In the absence of the electoral mechanism through which leaders are replaced in democracies, how do leaders take power or get replaced in authoritarian states? Why do some leadership transitions are peaceful and others are not?
* Ezrow and Frantz, Chapter 5 and pp. 240-255.
Case Study (9/22): Hereditary Succession
* Ezrow and Frantz, pp. 255-259.
* Lim, Jae-Cheon. 2012 “North Korea’s Hereditary Succession: Comparing Two Key Transitions in the DPRK.” Asian Survey, 52(3): 550-570.
* Brownlee, Jason. 2007. “Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies.” World Politics. 59(4): 595-628.
Week 4 (9/26): Power Sharing
What strategies do authoritarian rulers use to stay in power? To what extent do individual leaders and/or elites determine the character of dictatorship? How do authoritarian rulers manage internal conflict over policy issues and handle issues of succession?
* Ezrow and Frantz, Chapter 4, pp. 215-225.
* Svolik, Milan W., Chapter 3.
Case Study (10/3): Personalist Dictatorship in Sub-Saharan Africa and Beyond
* Ezrow and Frantz, pp. 225-235.
* Gorlizki, Yoram and Khlevniuk, Oleg. 2006. Stalin and his Circle. In Ronald G. Suny, editor, The Cambridge history of Russia, Volume 3, pages 243–267. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Part II: Institutions and Ruling Strategies
Week 5 (10/6): Political Parties
In what ways do parties provide effective organizations for helping authoritarian regimes remain in power? What are the difficulties and tradeoffs involved in creating strong authoritarian parties? What are sources of vulnerability in the authoritarian party systems?
* Ezrow and Frantz, Chapter 10.
* Svolik, Milan W., Chapter 6.
Case Study (10/10): The Party-State in China
* Li, Cheng. 2010. China’s Communist Party-State: The Structure and Dynamics of Power. In William A. Joseph, editor, Politics in China: An Introduction, pages 165–191. New York: Oxford University Press.
* Saich, Tony. 2021. From Rebel to Ruler: One Hundred Years of the Chinese Communist Party. Harvard University Press. pp. 1-18.
Week 6 (10/13): Legislatures
Why do authoritarian regimes often maintain legislatures given the lack of interest in genuine representation and accountability? How do legislatures in authoritarian contexts differ from the ones in democratic polities? Why is there “rule of law” in authoritarian regimes? How do constitutions, courts and judicial systems undermine or consolidate authoritarianism?
* Svolik, Milan W., Chapter 4.
- Jensen, Nathan M. et al. 2012. “What do legislatures in authoritarian regimes do?”, blog post on Monkey Cage. Available at https://themonkeycage.org/2012/12/what-do-legislatures-in-authoritarian-regimes-do/
Guest lecture (10/17) by Jing Yang, PhD candidate, Department of Political Science, Rutgers University
Case Study (10/20): “Rule of Law” in Authoritarian Regimes
* Moustafa, Tamir. “Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt.” in Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, edited by Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
* Magaloni, Beatriz. “Enforcing the Autocratic Political Order and the Role of Courts: The Case of México.” in Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, edited by Ginsburg and Mustafa, 180-206. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Week 7 (10/24): Elections
It is common that contemporary authoritarian regimes hold at least semi-competitive elections. Why have so many authoritarian rulers agreed to hold elections? In what ways can these elections facilitate democracy? In what ways can these elections serve as a tool to bolster authoritarian rule?
* Ezrow and Frantz, pp. 67-78.
* Schedler, Andreas. 2002. “Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Democracy, 13(2):36–50.
Case Study (10/27): Autocratic Elections
* Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Postcommunist Colored Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics, 5(4):535–551.
* Ellen Lust-Okar. 2006. “Elections Under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from
Jordan,” Democratization 13(3): 456-471.
Midterm Review and Exam (10/27): Topics for the midterm essays posted at Canvas
(10/30) Midterm exam (essays) due
Week 8 (10/31): Use of Force
The authoritarian states vary a lot in terms of how much repression they use -- from mild ones to psychotic. What prompts authoritarian rulers to use political repression, especially at the mass scale, and what consequences does it have on the society, opposition, and the regime itself.
* Ezrow and Frantz, Chapter 9.
* Svolik, Milan W., Chapter 5.
Case Study (11/3): Military Rule in Latin America
* Cohen, Youssef. 1987. “Democracy from Above: The Political Origins of Military
* Dictatorship in Brazil.” World Politics 40 (1): 30-54.
* Rouquie, Alain. 1987. The Military and the State in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Chapter 6. (ebook)
Week 9 (11/7): Distributive Politics
Under fiscal constraints, authoritarian rulers have to strategically distribute benefits to maintain support and buy off opponents in order to maximize the prospects of regime survival. How does a rich nature resource assist or prevent authoritarian rulers in benefit distribution for political interest? Is the resource a curse or blessing for authoritarian regime survival?
* Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Chapter 1.
* Michael L. Ross. 2001. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” World Politics 53(3): 325-361.
Guest Lecture (11/10) by Mai Alfarhan, PhD student, Department of Political Science, Rutgers University
Recommended Reading:
Friedman, Thomas L. 2006. “The First Law of Petropolitics.” Foreign Policy, (154):28–36.
Ross, Michael L. 2011. “Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring?” Foreign Affairs, 90(5): 2-7.
Treisman, Daniel. 2010. “Is Russia Cursed by Oil?” Journal of International Affairs, 63(2):85–102.
Week 10 (11/14): Media
What are authoritarian rulers’ goals when imposing media controls? Under what conditions can rulers achieve these goals? When might authoritarian regimes benefit from loosening media controls? How has the advent of the Internet and social media affected prospects for authoritarian regime survival?
* Lynch, Marc. “After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State.” Perspectives on Politics 9.2 (June 2011): 301-310.
* King Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts. 2013. “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression.” American Political Science Review. 107(2): 326-343.
Case Study (11/17): Is Technology a Challenge or Weapon for Authoritarian Regimes?
* Howard, Philip, and Muzammil Hussain. “The Role of Digital Media.” Journal of Democracy 22.3 (July 2011): 35-48.
* Gladwell, Macolm, “Small Change: Why the Revolution will not be Tweeted,” The New Yorker, October 4, 2010, 86 (30): 42-49. Available at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell
* China’s Surveillance State Has Tens of Millions of New Target. Available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/21/china-xinjiang-surveillance-state-police-targets/
Part III: Issues under Authoritarian Rule
Week 11 (11/21): Economy
Because regimes that are strong enough to enforce property rights are also strong enough to take them away, how can dictators ever credibly commit to protect property rights? What incentives do authoritarian regimes have to pursue policies that either promote or undermine economic growth? Under what conditions can authoritarian regimes succeed at promoting economic development?
* Ezrow and Frantz, Chapter 7.
* Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review, 87:567–576.
Case Study (11/22): Developmental States in East Asia
* “Examining Authoritarian Developmental States,” Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.
* Shirk, Susan. 1993. The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. Berkeley: University of California Press. Chapters 1-2.
Week 12 (11/28): Protests
What motivated and enabled ordinary citizens to suddenly rise up and precipitate authoritarian turnover like the one in several Middle Eastern/North African countries in the spring of 2011? What accounts for differences in outcomes across countries in the region? Which authoritarian tools that we have discussed proved most or least effective in response to protests?
* Kuran, Timur. 1991. “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989.” World Politics, 44:7–48.
* Bellin, Eva R. 2012. "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring." Comparative Politics, 44(2): 127-149.
Case Study (12/1): The Arab Spring
* Anderson, Lisa. 2011. “Demystifying the Arab Spring.” Foreign Affairs. 90(3): 2-7.
* Goldstone, Jack A., “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, Vol. 90, Issue 3, p. 8-16.
* Masoud, Tarek, Andrew Reynolds, and Jason Brownlee. “Tracking the ‘Arab Spring’: Why the Modest Harvest?”. Journal of Democracy 24, no. 4 (October 2013): 29-44.
Week 14 (12/5): Policymaking
Although authoritarian leaders typically have more space to maneuver the policy, often this presents more challenges than advantages. How is policy made under authoritarian rule? Are authoritarian regimes more effective and efficient than democratic regimes in policymaking? Does social policy crafted in dictatorships differ from social policy in democratic regimes?
* Ezrow and Frantz, Chapters 6 and 8.
Case Study (12/8): Social Wellbeing under Authoritarianism
* Justesen, Mogens. “Democracy, Dictatorship and Disease: Political Regimes and HIV/AIDS.” European Journal of Political Economy 28 (2012): 373-389.
* Truex, Rory. “The Myth of the Democratic Advantage.” Studies in Comparative International Development 52 (2017), 261–277.
Week 15 (12/12): Final Review and Exam
* Ezrow and Frantz, pp. 276-279.
* Svolik, Milan W., Chapter 7.
(12/16) Topics for the final essays posted at Canvas
(12/19) Final essays due
Course Summary:
| Date | Details | Due |
|---|---|---|