


Classical concept learning experiments (1960s)




- Experimenter teaches a “concept” to a subject, giving new **positive and negative** examples (with feedback) until subject learns successfully
- Dependent measure is number of trials (examples) required for successful learning
- Independent measure is the type of concept

Examples


Concept



×



×











×

square

affirmation

Examples

Concept

						small $\wedge$ green <i>conjunctive</i>
×	×	✓	×	✓	×	
						square $\vee$ red <i>disjunctive</i>
✓	✓	×	✓	×	✓	

Experimental conclusions

- Affirmation < Conjunction < Disjunction (inclusive) < Disjunction (exclusive)
 - especially: Conjunction < Disjunction
- This was seen as a very basic conclusion about learning
- But: it assumed that “concepts” were defined **logically**.

Classical vs. modern views of categories

- In the classical view, categories are **logical constructs** and have **definitions**

A **bachelor** is an unmarried adult male person

A **triangle** is a 3-sided geometric figure

- A definition lists **necessary and jointly sufficient** features

Being unmarried is **necessary**, but not sufficient


All 4 features are **jointly sufficient**.

- Bachelor $\leftrightarrow$ unmarried $\wedge$ adult $\wedge$ male $\wedge$ person

- Classical categories have clear-cut boundaries

Objects are either **members** or **non-members** of the category

Fuzziness and family resemblance



Ludwig Wittgenstein

- Most mental categories have “fuzzy” boundaries

Objects within them have a family resemblance
but no clear definition

- Examples:

game

furniture


bachelor (?)

even number (?)


Prototypes

- Posner & Keele (1968) taught subjects artificial categories by providing examples with various degrees of distortion.
 - Subjects induce a “**prototype**”—a characteristic “normal” form
 - ... even when highly typical examples were withheld (called **prototypification**).
- Eleanor Rosch (1973) studied color concepts in Dani people in Indonesia and concluded that concepts have “natural” central tendencies
 - Subjects had more trouble remembering **atypical** examples

Example: the bird category



Concept learning in the prototype model



“Average squirrel”

E.g.:

- Each feature **in proportion to its prevalence**
- **Mean** of positive examples

The prototype view

- The “prototype” (aka fuzzy, aka family-resemblance) view of human concepts:

Mental concepts exhibit degrees of membership, called **typicality**

... and are defined by their central tendencies, called **prototypes**.

- e.g. Birds usually have feathers, fly, lay eggs, sing, make nests, live in trees,

but none of these features are necessary or sufficient

- Category membership is determined by **similarity** to the prototype

Even definitional categories act fuzzy

- Armstrong, Gleitman & Gleitman (1983) tested very “definitional” categories like *odd number*, *female*, *grandmother*
 - Measured typicality ratings, RT to classify
- They found that **even these concepts** behave like fuzzy categories
- They argue however that definitions must be part of the meaning of certain concepts
- Instead they propose distinguishing between **core meaning** and **identification procedures**

Exemplar model

- In 1978 an alternative version of the “fuzzy” view was introduced, called the Exemplar model
- An exemplar model stores examples (called exemplars) to represent the “concept”
- Future instances are evaluated by comparison with the stored exemplars
 - X is a squirrel if it is more similar to stored examples of squirrels than it is to other stored exemplars
- There is no generalization or abstraction
- From about 1980-2010 much of the psychological literature centered on the battle between prototype models and exemplar models